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Abstract
The risks impacting ﬁnancial markets are attributable (at least in
part) to the actions of market participants. In turn, market partic-
ipants’ actions depend on perceived risk. In equilibrium, risk is the
ﬁxed point of the mapping from perceived risk to actual risk. When
market players believe trouble is ahead, they take actions that bring
about realized volatility. This is “endogenous risk.” A model of en-
dogenous risk enables the study of the propagation of ﬁnancial booms
and distress. Among other things, we can make precise the notion
that market participants appear to become “more risk–averse” in re-
sponse to deteriorating market outcomes. For economists, preferences
and beliefs would normally be considered independent of one another.
We discuss modeling of endogenous risk and some of its distinctive
features, both theoretical and empirical.1 Introduction
Financial crises are often accompanied by sharp price changes. Commen-
tators and journalists delight in attributing such unruly volatility to the
herd mentality of the ﬁnancial market participants, or to the ﬁckleness and
irrationality of speculators who seemingly switch between fear and overcon-
ﬁdence in a purely random fashion. Such crisis episodes lead to daily head-
lines in ﬁnancial newspapers such as “Risk Aversion Rises” or “Risk Aversion
Abates.”
Such price swings would be consistent with price eﬃciency if they were en-
tirely driven by payoﬀ-relevant fundamental news. A large part of this
volatility is however due to a number of feedback eﬀects that are hard-wired
into the system. We labelled this risk endogenous risk in Dan´ ıelsson and Shin
(2003) to emphasize that while the seeds of the volatility are exogenous, a
large part of its eventual realized magnitude is due to the ampliﬁcation of
the exogenous news within the system.
Endogenous risk is the additional risk and volatility that the ﬁnancial system
adds on top of the equilibrium risk and volatility as commonly understood.
For this reason, in the formal modeling exercise we will assume that ﬁnancial
institutions are risk neutral. This has the advantage that any feedback eﬀects
must be due to the system itself, rather than due to the risk averse behavior
of the ﬁnancial institutions.
Once the ﬁnancial system is fully modeled to take account of the hard-wiring
of risk feedback, it has the potential to magnify risk considerably. However,
by the same token, the system can dampen realized risks “artiﬁcially” thereby
encouraging the build-up of potential vulnerabilities. Part of our task is to
show under which circumstances the magniﬁcations occur. For empirical
evidence iAdrian and Shin (2010) who note that the major market–based
ﬁnancial intermediaries were deleveraging aggressively during the crisis, and
that such ﬁnancial intermediaries could be seen as the marginal investors for
the determination of risk premiums.
In our model, endogenous risk and the inherent nonlinearities of the system
are associated with ﬂuctuations in the capitalization of the ﬁnancial sector.
As the capital of the ﬁnancial sector ﬂuctuates, so does realized risks. The
balance sheet capacity of the ﬁnancial sector ﬂuctuates for both reasons.
The risk exposure supported by each dollar of capital ﬂuctuates due to shifts
2in measured risks, and so does the aggregate dollar capital of the ﬁnancial
sector itself.
The mutual dependence of realized risks and the willingness to bear risk
means that the risk capacity of the ﬁnancial system can undergo large changes
over the cycle. Occasionally, short and violent bouts of risk shedding sweep
the markets during which the ﬁnancial institutions’ apparent willingness to
bear risk evaporates. Those are the episodes that are reported on in news
under the headline “risk aversion.” It is as if there was a latent risk aversion
process that drives ﬁnancial markets. Of course, the ﬂuctuation in risk aver-
sion is itself endogenous, and in this paper we sketch the mechanisms that
drive the ﬂuctuation.
By conceptualizing the problem in terms of constraints rather than prefer-
ences, we can address an apparent puzzle. How can it be that human be-
ings are risk averse one day, in a perfectly coordinated fashion, selling their
risky holdings across the board and reinforcing the crisis, only to become
contagiously risk-loving not too long thereafter, pushing prices back to the
pre–crisis levels? Surely they do not all together feel compelled to look right
and left ten times before crossing the street one day while blindly crossing
the next?
We then apply the results from the theoretical model to more practical ques-
tions of systemic risk. Empirical studies and ﬁnancial history have taught us
that ﬁnancial markets go through long periods of tranquility interspersed by
short episodes of instability, or even crises. Such behavior can be understood
within our framework as periods where leverage growth and asset growth go
together, leading ﬁnancial institutions on a path driven by positive feedback
between increasing leverage, purchases of risky assets and higher prices. Dur-
ing this period, greater willingness to take on risk dampens measured risks
and tends to reinforce the dormant volatility. The active trading by ﬁnan-
cial institutions works to reduce volatility while thickening the tails of the
outcome distribution, and increase the magnitudes of extreme events.
The ampliﬁcation of risk over the cycle poses considerable challenges for bank
capital regulation. A fundamental tenet of microprudential capital regula-
tion is the idea that if every institution is individually safe, then so is the
ﬁnancial system itself. A surprising and counterintuitive result of analyzing
prudential regulations is that the individually prudent behavior by a ﬁnan-
cial institutions causes an overall ampliﬁed crisis. This is an illustration of
3the fallacy of composition, as discussed by Dan´ ıelsson, Embrechts, Goodhart,
Keating, Muennich, Renault, and Shin (2001), which criticized the Basel II
capital rules on these grounds.
Our results also have implications for ﬁnancial risk forecasting and recent
models of empirical systemic risk forecasting. The vast majority of such
models assumes ﬁnancial risk is exogenous, which may be an innocuous as-
sumption during times when the ﬁnancial markets are calm, but not during
market turmoil. In general, an assumption of exogenous risk is likely to lead
to an underestimation of risk when things are calm and overestimation dur-
ing crisis. This means that most extant ﬁnancial risk forecast models and
empirical systemic risk models might fail when needed the most, i.e., in the
accurate forecasting of extreme risk.
There are also implications for regulation of over the counter (OTC) deriva-
tives. The impact of moving OTC derivatives to central counterparties
(CCPs) are analyzed by Zigrand (2010) in the light of endogenous risk. He
notes that CCPs need to protect themselves from counterparty risk, imply-
ing institutionalized initial margin and maintenance margin rules based on
continuous marking–to–market. Endogenous risk appears in several guises,
to be elaborated below.
2 Endogenous Risk and Price Movements
In the main, price movements have two components — a portion due to the
incorporation of fundamentals news, and an endogenous feedback component
due to the trading patterns of the market participants over and above the
incorporation of fundamentals news.
Large price movements driven by fundamentals news occur often in ﬁnancial
markets, and do not constitute a crisis. Public announcements of impor-
tant macroeconomic statistics are sometimes marked by large, discrete price
changes at the time of announcement. These changes are arguably the signs
of a smoothly functioning market that is able to incorporate new information
quickly.
In contrast, the distinguishing feature of crisis episodes is that they seem
to gather momentum from the endogenous responses of the market partici-
pants themselves. This is the second component, the portion associated with
4endogenous risk (see Dan´ ıelsson and Shin, 2003). We can draw an analogy
with a tropical storm gathering force over a warm sea or with the wobbly
Millennium bridge in London.
A small gust of wind produce a small sway in the Millennium bridge. Pedes-
trians crossing the bridge would then adjust their stance slightly as a re-
sponse, pushing the bridge further in the same direction. Provided suﬃ-
ciently many pedestrians found themselves in the same situation, they will
ﬁnd themselves coordinating spontaneously and unwittingly to move in lock-
step, thereby reinforcing the swaying into a something much more violent.
Even if the initial gust of wind is long gone, the bridge continues to wobble.
Similarly, ﬁnancial crises appear to gather more energy as they develop. And
even if the initial shock is gone, volatility stays high. What would have been
almost impossible if individual steps are independent becomes a sure thing
given feedback between the movement of the bridge and the adjustment by
pedestrians, see Figure 1.





By analogy, as ﬁnancial conditions worsen, the willingness of market partic-
ipants to bear risk seemingly evaporates even in the absence of any further
hard news, which in turn worsens ﬁnancial conditions, closing the loop. Any
regulatory interventions might be best aimed at understanding and mitigat-
ing those negative spillover eﬀects created purely within the ﬁnancial sys-
tem. If one cannot prevent gusts of wind, then at least one can make sure
the pedestrians do not act in lockstep and cause the bridge to collapse by
critically amplifying the initial swing.
The workings of endogenous risk can be sketched as follows. An initial nega-
tive piece of news, leading either to capital losses to the ﬁnancial institutions
(FI) or to an increase in market volatility, must be followed by a risk ex-
5posure reduction on behalf of many market participants (or capital raising,
which are diﬃcult to do pull oﬀ quickly, especially in the midst of a crisis).
The reason for contagious behavior lies in the coordinated responses of mar-
ket participants arising from the fact that market prices are imperatives for
action through risk constraints imposed on individual traders or desks (such
as Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraints1), or through the increase in haircuts and
the implied curtailment of leverage by credit providers.
To the extent that such rules are applied continuously, the market partici-
pants are induced to behave in a short–termist manner. It follows that the
initial wave of asset sales depresses prices further, increasing the perceived
risk as well as reducing capitalization levels further, forcing a further round
of ﬁre sales, and so on. The fall in valuation levels is composed of a ﬁrst
chunk attributable to the initial piece of bad news, as well as to a second
chunk entirely due to the non-information related feedback eﬀects of market
participants. In formal models of this phenomenon, the feedback eﬀects can
be many times larger than the initial seed of bad news.
2.1 Leading Model
We illustrate the ideas sketched above through the dynamic model of endoge-
nous risk developed in Dan´ ıelsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2011). The model has
the advantage that it leads to a rational expectations equilibrium that can
be solved in closed form. Here, we give a thumbnail sketch of the workings
of the model. The detailed solution and the properties of the model can be
found in Dan´ ıelsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2011).
Time ﬂows continuously in [0,∞). Active traders (ﬁnancial institutions)
maximize proﬁt by investing in risky securities as well as the riskless secu-
rity. The ﬁnancial institutions are subject to a short-term Value–at–Risk
(VaR) constraint stipulating that the Value-at-Risk is no higher than capital
(tangible common equity), given by Vt. In order to emphasize the speciﬁc
contribution of risk constraints to endogenous risk, all other channels are
switched oﬀ. The short rate of interest r is determined exogenously.
1See Dan´ ıelsson and Zigrand (2008) where a VaR constraint lessens a free-riding ex-
ternality in ﬁnancial markets, and Adrian and Shin (2010) for a model whereby a VaR
constraint is imposed in order to alleviate a moral hazard problem within a ﬁnancial
institution.
6Given rational behavior, prices, quantities and expectations can be shown to
be driven in equilibrium by a set of relevant aggregate variables, chieﬂy the
(mark–to–market) capitalization level of the ﬁnancial sector. The ﬁnancial
institutions are interacting with each other and with passive investors (the
non–ﬁnancial investors, including individual investors, pension funds and so
forth).
The risky security has an (instantaneous) expected equilibrium return µt
and volatility of σt. The equilibrium processes µ and σ are endogenous and
forward looking in the sense that the beliefs (˜ µt, ˜ σt) about actual moments
(µt,σt) are conﬁrmed in equilibrium. Financial institutions in equilibrium
hold diversiﬁed portfolios commensurate with those beliefs, scaled down by
their eﬀective degree of relative risk aversion γt (solved in equilibrium) im-






t (µt − r) (1)
with D the monetary value of their holdings.
The model is closed by introducing value investors who supply downward-
sloping demand curves for the risky asset. The value investors in aggregate





(zt − lnPt) (2)
where Pt is the market price for risky asset and where dzt is a (favorable) Itˆ o
demand shock to the demand of the risky asset. Each demand curve can be
viewed as a downward sloping demand hit by demand shocks, with δ being
a scaling parameter that determines the size of the value investor sector.
Even though the ﬁnancial institutions are risk neutral, the VaR constraints
imply that they are compelled to act “as if” they were risk averse and scale
their risky holdings down if VaR is high compared to their capitalization
level: 2
coeﬃcient of eﬀective relative risk aversion
= coeﬀ. of relative risk aversion
+ Lagrange multiplier on the VaR constraint
2This goes back to Dan´ ıelsson and Zigrand (2008), ﬁrst circulated as Dan´ ıelsson and
Zigrand (2001).






































Thus, even if the traders were risk-neutral, they would act in a risk-averse
way depending on how tightly the risk constraint is binding. Figure 2
illustrates the general intuition as to why risk aversion is eﬀectively ﬂuc-
tuating randomly as a function of the tightness of the VaR constraints of
ﬁnancial institutions. For the purpose of illustration, we draw the indﬀer-
ence curves consistent with some degree of inherent risk aversion. Suppose
the FI initially has suﬃcient capital so that its Value–at–Risk constraint is
non–binding at VaR0. In this case, the indiﬀerence curve is U1. Suppose
investment opportunities stay constant but capital is reduced, so that the
VaR constraint becomes binding at VaR1. Therefore, the optimal portfolio
chosen is no longer a tangency point between the indiﬀerence curve (shifted
down to U∗
1) and the eﬃcient set. An outside observer might conclude that
the VaR constrained portfolio choice actually was the choice of a more risk
averse investor (steeper indiﬀerence curve U2): “as if” risk aversion increased.
In the dynamic model, investment opportunities change endogenously as well
of course.
In a rational expectations equilibrium, the actual volatility of prices implicit
in this equation, σt, and the beliefs about the volatility, ˜ σt, must coincide.
To compute the actual volatility of returns, we resort to Itˆ o’s Lemma and
8get
σt = ησz + ˜ σt × (diﬀusion of Vt)
| {z }
vol due to FI’s wealth-VaR eﬀect
+Vt × (diﬀusion of ˜ σt)
| {z }
vol due to changing beliefs
= ησz + Vt
￿





Equilibrium volatility is determined as the ﬁxed point where σt = ˜ σt, which
entails solving for the function σt (Vt) from an ordinary diﬀerential equation.
























The Ei(w) function is deﬁned provided w  = 0. The expression α2δ/Vt which
appears prominently in the closed form solution (3) can be interpreted as the
relative scale or size of the value investor sector (parameter δ) compared to
the banking sector (total capital Vt normalized by VaR).
The closed form solution also reveals much about the basic shape of the
volatility function σ(Vt). Consider the limiting case when the banking sec-
tor is very small, that is, Vt → 0. Then α2δ/Vt becomes large, but the
exponential term exp{−α2δ/Vt} dominates, and the product of the two goes
to zero. However, since we have exogenous shocks to the value investor
demands, there should still be non-zero volatility at the limit, given by the
fundamental volatility ησz. The role of the Ei(w) term is to tie down
the end point so that the limiting volatility is given by this fundamental
volatility.
The endogenous term reduces the fundamental volatility if the FI are suﬃ-
ciently capitalized (i.e. if Vt is large enough) and dramatically increases the
volatility in a non-linear fashion as V drops, as depicted on Figure 3 where
the properties of our model are illustrated graphically.
3http://mathworld.wolfram.com/ExponentialIntegral.html
9The Figure plots the equilibrium diﬀusion σt, the drift (expected return) µt
and risk–aversion γt as a function of the state variable Vt. The parameters
chosen for all plots in this paper are r = 0.01, δ = 0.5 , α = 5, σz = 0.4,
η = 1 and c = 10. There is nothing special about this particular parameter
constellation, almost any other combination of parameters would generate
the same shapes of the plots and hence results. For this reason, the choice
of parameters is not very important for understanding the basic intuition as
a model. However, diﬀerent parameters generate diﬀerent magnitudes, and
for this reason, we roughly calibrated the parameters so the outcome would
correspond to daily returns for relatively high risk stocks. In future work we
are planning to estimate the model, i.e., make the parameters be data driven.
σ is the equilibrium volatility and γt is the endogenous eﬀective risk aversion.
Higher levels of capital represent a well capitalized banking sector, where
volatility is below the fundamental annual volatility of 40%. As capital is
depleted, volatilities, risk premia and Sharpe ratios increase.
In the extreme case where capital gets fully depleted to zero, the economy
has no ﬁnancial institutions, and so volatility is equal to the fundamental
volatility. With a well capitalized ﬁnancial sector, variance is low as the
ﬁnancial sector absorbs risk.
Figure 3: Equilibrium Risk Premia, Volatility and Risk–Aversion/Sharpe
Ratio





















In the leading model, volatility, risk premia as well as generalized Sharpe
ratios are all countercyclical, rising dramatically in a downturn, providing
10ex ante compensation for the risks taken as illustrated in Figure 3. These
features align our model with available empirical evidence. As can be seen
from the graphs, market volatility is a function of the state variable Vt and
so the model generates stochastic volatility.
Volatility is lower than fundamental news–induced volatility in times when
the ﬁnancial sector is well–capitalized, when ﬁnancial institutions play the
role of a buﬀer that absorbs risks and thereby reduce the equilibrium volatility
of ﬁnancial markets. FI are able to perform this function because by having
a suﬃcient capital level, their VaR constraints are binding less hard, allowing
them to act as risk absorbers. However, as their capital is depleted due to
negative shocks, their risk constraints bind harder inducing them to shed risk
and amplify market distress.
A similar picture emerges in a multivariate version of the model when there
is more than one risky security. The added dimension allows us to address
the emergence of endogenous correlation in the returns of risky assets whose
fundamentals are unrelated. We illustrate the properties of the bivariate case
in Figure 4. Here, Σii is the variance of the returns on security i and ρij is
the correlation coeﬃcient between the returns on securities i and j, where
securities i and j are intrinsically uncorrelated.
Figure 4: Equilibrium correlations









113 Feedback Eﬀects and Empirical Predictions
Some features of the model of endogenous risk can be presented under several
sub-headings. We begin with the role of constraints in propagating feedback.
3.1 Constraints and Feedback
The main driver of the results in the leading model are feedback eﬀects
which increase in strength along with the homogeneity in behavior and beliefs
amongst ﬁnancial institutions (ﬁnancial institutions), especially during crises.
Just as in the example of the Millennium Bridge where an initial gust of wind
eventually causes the pedestrians to react identically and at the same time,
constraints on ﬁnancial institutions together with marking–to–market can
lead to synchronized institutional behavior in response to an external shock.
The ultimate eﬀect is to synchronize the behavior of all ﬁnancial institutions,
dampening risks in the up-turn and amplifying risks in the downturn.
For a well-capitalized ﬁnancial sector, correlations between the various se-
curities are reduced since the ﬁnancial institutions have ample capacity to
absorb risk. For low levels of capital, however, volatility increases as shown
in Figure 4. This gives rise to an adverse feedback loop. When capital falls,
ﬁnancial institutions need to shed their risky exposures, reducing prices and
raising volatility across all securities. This in turn forces ﬁnancial institutions
to engage in another round of ﬁre sales, and so forth. This is illustrated in
Figure 3. These eﬀects are summarized in Figure 5, where an initial adverse
shock to capital leads to an adverse feedback loop.
Figure 5: Feedback in Leading Model
Exogenous adverse
shock to capital crisis
risk (vol and corr) increase
sell risky assets
ﬁre sale prices
12Within the leading model, the feedback eﬀects can be understood in terms
of the slope of the demand functions of the ﬁnancial institutions. When the
ﬁnancial sector is undercapitalized, an adverse shock prompts the ﬁnancial
institutions to shed risky securities because risk constraints bind harder and
because the price drop leads to a capital loss. So a lower price prompts a
sale rather than a purchase. This sale in turn prompts a further fall in price
and the loop closes.
This is demonstrated in Figure 6 which plots supply and demand responses.
Note that Figure 6 charts total demand response taking account of changes
in V and volatility in equilibrium, not the demand curve in a partial equilib-
rium sense at a given V for diﬀerent prices. In other words, Figure 6 shows
the continually evolving demand response as the FI continues buying or sell-
ing. The reduced-form demand function is upward sloping4 for low levels of
capital. As prices increase so does demand. This phenomenon is what gives
rise to the ampliﬁcation eﬀects in the Monte Carlo simulations in Figures 7
and 8. As the FI becomes better capitalized, its equilibrium demand function
assumes the typical downward shape. Instead, for small V , the FI increases
endogenous risk, while for larger capital levels it decreases endogenous risk.
We further demonstrate this feature by means of simulations of price paths.
Figure 7 shows a typical path with a year and a half worth of prices in a
univariate model in the absence of risk-constrained traders (and hence where
prices follow a geometric Brownian motion). The prices in the absence of
risk constraints (Pa for autarchy) rise slowly (at a mean rate of return equal
to the risk free rate), followed by a crash in the beginning of the second
year. For the same sequence of fundamental shocks the prices when there
are risk-constrained FIs (PFI) show a much bigger rise followed by a bigger
crash.
3.2 Endogenous Risk and Comovements
Correlations (or more generally dependence, linear or non-linear) between
risky assets are of key importance in characterizing market returns. In the
absence of correlations in the fundamentals, diversiﬁcation can enable the
4An early example of an endogenous risk-type result with an upward sloping demand
functions comes from Gennotte and Leland (1990). In their model of portfolio insurance,
delta hedging of a synthetic put option requires the delta–hedger to sell a security into a
falling market, magnifying the volatility.
13Figure 6: The Demand Function
Same parameters. Low capital is V = 4, medium capital V = 19 and high capital V = 34


















Figure 7: Simulation of Price Paths
Start at V = 12. In ﬁrst case σ and µ are constants, since the FI exerts no price impact
when not present in market.















mitigation of risk. However, endogenous risk and the associated risk con-
straints imply that assets whose fundamentals are unrelated may still give
rise to correlations in market prices due to the ﬂuctuations in risk constraints
14of the FIs. Since risk constraints give rise to “as if” risk aversion, the cor-
relation in return is associated with ﬂuctuations in the degree of as-if risk
aversion. The sudden increase in correlations during the crisis is well doc-
umented and has repeatedly wrong-footed sophisticated proprietary trading
desks in many banks that have attempted to exploit historical patterns in
asset returns.5 In crises, volatilities and implied volatilities shoot up at the
same time, whether it be the implied volatility of S&P 500 options or of
interest rate swaptions. Again, all those spikes in comovements are driven
by the same unifying heightened eﬀective risk aversion factor, itself driven
by the capitalization level in the ﬁnancial sector.
We illustrate this by simulating price paths for the bivariate model, shown
in Figure 8. The correlations initially decline slowly, the price of the second
asset increases sharply while the price of the ﬁrst asset is steady. Then in
year 4, an averse shock to its price leads to a sharp increase in correlations,
causing the price of the ﬁrst asset to fall as well.


































As we see from Figure 4, variances move together, and so do variances with
correlations. This feature is consistent with the empirical evidence in Ander-
sen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Ebens (2001) who show that
“there is a systematic tendency for the variances to move to-
5This occurs in equilibrium in our model, with the FI portfolio that gives rise to the
described oﬄoading itself chosen in equilibrium.
15gether, and for the correlations among the diﬀerent stocks to
be high/low when the variances for the underlying stocks are
high/low, and when the correlations among the other stocks are
also high/low.”
They conjecture that these co–movements occur in a manner broadly consis-
tent with a latent factor structure. A good candidate for such a latent factor
would be the tightness of the risk constraint implied by FIs’ capitalization
discussed above.
3.3 Endogenous Risk and the Implied Volatility Skew
Options markets oﬀer a direct window displaying endogenous risk in simple
graphical terms. Equity index options markets have, at least since 1987, con-
sistently displayed a skew that is fanning–out over longer maturities. Out–
of–the–money puts have much higher implied volatilities than out–of–the–
money calls. Shorter dated options have a more pronounced skew compared
to longer dated options. The fear in the market that drives such features in
the options market seems to be of a latent violent downturn (against which
the expensive out–of–the money puts are designed to protect), while strings
of positive news over the longer term are expected to lead to less volatile
returns over longer horizons, the great moderation. The sharp downturn is
not expected to be permanent, hence the mean–reverting fanning–out of the
skew. We ﬁnd this result in our model, see Figure 9.
Our discussion of the way in which endogenous risk plays out in the market
is a promising way to address the stylized empirical features in the option
market. Endogenous risk embeds an asymmetry between the downside and
the upside. Depletion of capital and endogenously increasing risks generate
sharply higher volatility, while no such corresponding eﬀects operate on the
upside. The widely accepted version of the events of the stock market crash
of October 1987 (see for instance the formulation of Gennotte and Leland
(1990)) places at the center of the explanation the feedback eﬀects from syn-
thetic delta–hedged puts embedded in portfolio insurance mandates. The
“ﬂash crash” of May 6th 2010 almost certainly has more complex under-
pinnings, but it would be a reasonable conjecture that the program trades
executed by algorithmic high frequency traders conspired in some way to


































Figure 9: Implied Volatility Surface
As well as the omnipresent implied volatility skew at any given moment in
time, our model also predicts that implied volatilities move together in a
crisis, which has indeed occurred, across securities as well as across asset
classes.
4 Implications for Financial Regulation
As we have seen, the ﬁnancial system can go through long periods of relative
tranquility, but once endogenous risk breaks out, it grips the entire ﬁnancial
markets. This happens because the balance sheets of large ﬁnancial institu-
tions link all securities. Our results hold important implications for ﬁnancial
regulation. Regulators will need to be prepared for prospect that once a
storm hits, it has a signiﬁcant probability of being a “perfect storm” where
everything goes wrong at the same time. In the presence of endogenous risk,
the focus of regulatory policy should be more towards the system, rather
17than individual institutions. Even if the economy starts out stable, contin-
ued prosperity makes way to an unstable system. An apposite comment is
given in Crockett (2000):
“The received wisdom is that risk increases in recessions and falls
in booms. In contrast, it may be more helpful to think of risk
as increasing during upswings, as ﬁnancial imbalances build up,
and materialising in recessions.”
This reasoning is also consistent with Minsky’s ﬁnancial instability hypoth-
esis. Stability can sow the seeds of future instability because ﬁnancial in-
stitutions have a tendency to react to the tranquility by building up their
risky asset holdings that increase the thickness of the left tail of the future
outcome distribution, which ultimately undermines stability. At some point,
a negative shock arrives, and markets go through an abrupt correction. The
longer is the period of dormant volatility, the more abrupt and violent is the
correction when it arrives.
While our model of endogenous risk has a single state variable (the FI capital
level V ), it would be possible to develop more complex versions where the
history of the ﬁnancial system aﬀects future crisis dynamics. One way of
doing so would be to posit market participants who extrapolate from last
market outcomes in the manner recommended by standard risk management
systems that use time series methods in forecasting volatility. One popu-
lar version of belief updating is the exponentially-weighted moving average
(EWMA) method that forecasts future volatility as a function of last return
realizations.
To the extent that volatility is simply dormant during upturns rather than
being absent, there is a rationale for counter-cyclical tools that lean against
the build-up of vulnerabilitis during upturns.
Our model of endogenous risk is consistent with leveraging and deleverag-
ing of ﬁnancial intermediaries as discussed by Adrian and Shin (2010) and
Dan´ ıelsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2011). Credit increases rapidly during the
boom but increases less rapidly (or even decreases) during the downturn,
driven partly by shifts in the banks’ willingness to take on risky positions
over the cycle. The evidence that banks’ willingness to take on risky expo-
sures ﬂuctuates over the cycle is especially clear for ﬁnancial intermediaries
that operate in the capital market.
18Deleveraging causes risk aversion to curtail credit in the economy, leading to
a downturn in economic activity. The role of a liquidity and capital provider
of last resort can be important in dampening ﬁnancial distress. While ﬁnan-
cial institutions may be overly leveraged going into a crisis, the endogenous
feedback eﬀects may lead to excessive deleveraging relative to the funda-
mentals of the economy, prompting institutions to curtail lending to the real
economy.
4.1 Forecasting Risk
Our model of endogenous risk has direct implications for empirical risk fore-
casting. Almost every model used in practice for forecasting risk, assumes
ﬁnancial risk is exogenous. In other words, the ﬁnancial institutions are price
takers where their trading decisions do not aﬀect price dynamics. So long
as individual trading portfolios represent a relatively small part of overall
market capitalization and ﬁnancial institutions are diﬀerent, an assumption
of exogenous risk is relatively innocuous. This is likely to be the situation
most of the time, perhaps 99.9% of all trading days.
It is however the other 0.1% that matter most for ﬁnancial stability. That
this when market turmoil becomes extreme, constraints become especially
binding and ﬁnancial institutions start acting in harmony, shedding the same
risky assets and buying the same safe assets. At that time, ﬁnancial risk
becomes highly endogenous implying that ﬁnancial risk forecast models based
on an assumption of exogeneity of risk are likely to fail.
The underlying reason is the dual role of market prices. On the one hand,
market prices reﬂect the current value of an asset, but on the other, they also
reﬂect the constraints on ﬁnancial institutions, and hence are an imperative
to act. Constraints may not be binding tightly during calm times but may
become highly restrictive during crisis, leading to adverse feedback between
increasingly tight constraints and falling asset prices.
This suggests that market prices during periods of calm may be a poor input
into forecast models, since any reliable empirical systemic risk model needs
to address the transition from non–crisis to crisis. Market prices during calm
times may not be informative about the distribution of prices that follow
after a crisis is triggered. In addition, price dynamics during one crisis may
be quite diﬀerent in the next, limiting the ability to draw inference from
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Consequently, risk models are likely to underestimate risk during calm times
and overestimate risk during crisis — they get it wrong in all states of the
world.
4.2 Empirically Modelling Systemic Risk
The tendency of risk models to fail during crisis, as discussed above has
particular implications for the the burgeoning ﬁeld of empirical systemic risk
modeling. Here, the question of interest is not the risk of ﬁnancial institutions
failing, but rather the risk of cascading failures. Consequently, the challenge
for a reliable systemic risk model is to capture the risk of each systematically
important institution, as well as their interactions. These models generally
attempt to use observed market variables to provide an indication of the risk
of some future systemic event. The current crop of systemic risk models is
examined empirically by Danielsson, James, Valenzuela, and Zer (2011) who
ﬁnd that because of high model risk, such models are highly unreliable.
Systemic risk is concerned with events that happen during crisis conditions,
looking far into the tails of distributions. This makes the paucity of relevant
data a major concern. Over the last ﬁfty or so years we have observed less
than a dozen episodes of extreme international market turmoil. Each of these
events is essentially unique, driven by diﬀerent underlying causes. We should
therefore expect that models that are fed with inputs from calm periods will
perform much less well during periods of stress.
As a consequence, we feel that the current crop of systemic risk forecast mod-
els is unlikely to perform as expected. Instead, such models would need to
incorporate endogenous risk explicitly if they are to capture the the underes-
timation of systemic risk prior to a crisis event, as well as the overestimation
of systemic risk during the crisis event, both of which are damaging.
4.3 Leverage and Capital
Endogenous risk implies non–linearities due to the feedbacks that conspire
to make the regulator’s problem very diﬃcult. Capital held by the FI is
proportional to the risk–tolerance of the non-ﬁnancial sector times the square






where VaRt is proportional to volatility over short periods. In other words,
the growth rate of the capital ratio is equal to the growth rate of volatility.
Leverage is procyclical and builds up in quiet booms where VaR is low and
unwinds in the crisis. In practice, deleveraging is exacerbated by increased
haircuts, reinforcing the feedback loops further through this second channel of
forced delevering, see Xiong (2001), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Geanakoplos
(2010), Adrian and Shin (2010) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Of
course, if capital requirements are not risk–based, for example by using the
leverage ratio, procyclicality is not increased by the capital requirements.
Financial crises and strong destabilizing feedback eﬀects naturally occur
when capital levels are too low, as can be seen in the Figures above. When
capitalization is adequate, ﬁnancial institutions allow absorption and diﬀu-
sion of risk, resulting in calmer and more liquid markets to prevail. But
endogenous risk raises the fundamental level of volatility in the economy
during periods of low capitalization and diminishes the fundamental level of
volatility otherwise.
Low capitalization therefore go hand–in–hand with low liquidity. 7 The
ﬁrst eﬀects of the recent crisis became visible through a liquidity crisis in
the summer of 2007, where central bank interventions were crucial, but then
the crisis quickly turned into a solvency crisis. The liquidity crisis was the
harbinger of the later solvency crisis. The two must be linked in any account
of the recent crisis.
Countercyclical measures that reduce the feedback loops can be one way to
mitigate the boom bust cycle. Capital adequacy therefore has a major role
to play. Since the strength of the adverse feedbacks is very sensitive to the
procyclicality of capital adequacy rules, a suﬃcient capital buﬀer needs to
be imposed in conjunction with countercyclical rules that lean against the
build-up of vulnerabilities during the boom. A large capital buﬀer that either
cannot be used, or that imposes positive feedback loops, is counterproductive
6In Basel II, the level of tightness of the VaR constraints for market risk is three times
the relevant quantile.
7Recall the earlier discussion on the critical level of capital that would allow the ﬁnancial
system to perform its socially useful role.
21exactly in those situations where it would be needed most. This is aptly
demonstrated by Goodhart’s metaphor of the weary traveller and the lone
cab driver, (Goodhart, 2009, ch 8). A weary traveler arrives late at night
by train to an unknown town. One taxi is waiting and the traveler goes to
it requesting to be taken to his hotel. The taxi driver refuses and points to
a sign on the wall that says “local regulations stipulate that a taxi must be
present at the taxi stand at all times.” In addition, excessive bank capital
tied up in government bonds is socially costly because it hampers the socially
optimal activities of banks, to transform maturities and to take on risks by
lending.
Risk builds up during the good times when perceived risk is low and im-
prudent leverage and complex ﬁnancial networks build up quietly, perhaps
aided by moral hazard (Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez (2010)).
It is only in a crisis that this risk materializes and becomes plainly visible.
A promising avenue to think about capital adequacy, based on an idea in
chapters 10 and 11 in Goodhart (2009), that deserves further thought would
be to require ﬁnancial institutions to set aside an initial capital buﬀer, plus
an additional variation capital buﬀer that is a function of the growth rate
of various assets (both on and oﬀ balance sheet) as well as of the maturity
mismatch (and of the probable liquidity in a crisis) imposed by those asset
classes.
The variation buﬀer can then be naturally and countercyclically depleted in
a downturn, provided the ﬁnancial institutions do not feel compelled to take
large amounts of hidden toxic assets back onto their balance sheets during
the downturn. As far as we know, this idea has yet to be formally analyzed.
Note, however, that while countercyclical regulatory capital requirements
are a step forward,8 they are not suﬃcient to stem all procyclical forces in
the markets. For instance, ﬁnancial institutions will still allocate capital
to traders according to a VaR type formula, forcing them to unwind risky
positions if risk shoots up. Haircuts will always go up in a downturn. Central
clearing houses will impose daily settlement and contribute to procyclicality.
Net derivative positions will still be at least partly delta hedged, implying
reinforcing feedback eﬀects (on top of the VaR induced feedback eﬀects) if
delta hedgers are net short gamma.
8Whereas regulators relaxed capital adequacy requirements during the S&L crisis, no
such formal countercyclical regulatory forbearance seems to have been applied in this
crisis.
22In summary, the omnipresence and inevitability of adverse procyclical spillover
eﬀects in ﬁnancial markets reinforces the need for countercyclical regulatory
capital rules.
4.4 Endogenous Risk and Central Clearing Counter-
parties (CCPs)
The volume of over the counter (OTC) derivatives exceeds the global annual
GDP by some margin and such derivatives have been widely blamed for their
contribution to systemic risk. In particular, the opaque nature of the OTC
market, coupled with counterparty risk have been singled out as especially
dangerous. Consequently, there are ongoing discussions about moving a non–
negligible fraction of the OTC trade onto central counterparties (CCPs), with
the expectation that the most dangerous systematic impacts of OTC would
be mitigated if they were forced to be centrally cleared.
This directly related to the very recent development of credit value adjust-
ment (CVA) desks in ﬁnancial institutions which now are some of the largest
desks in ﬁnancial institutions.
The impact of moving OTC derivatives to CCPs are analyzed by Zigrand
(2010) in the context of endogenous risk. He notes that CCPs need to protect
themselves from counterparty risk, implying institutionalized initial margin
and maintenance margin rules based on frequent marking–to–market. We
have observed above that such margin calls bear the hidden risk of exasper-
ating downward spirals. Endogenous risk appears in at least ﬁve guises.
First, an important question to ask is to what extent the current OTC mar-
kets resemble CCPs, i.e. how many feedback rules are embedded already in
OTC? Daily collateral exchanges in the OTC market play the role of daily
margin calls, and up–front collateral (“independent amount”) plays the role
of the initial margin. So some of the mechanisms to reduce counterparty
risk are also applied in the OTC market, of course. Still, it seems that a
suﬃciently large part of the OTC exposures have not been dealt with in
this way. ISDA states that 70% of OTC derivatives trades are collateralized,
while a survey by the ECB (2009) estimated that EU bank exposures may be
collateralized well below this. Singh (2010) estimates under collateralization
is about 2 trillion dollars for residual derivative payables. This justiﬁes our
working hypothesis that should trade move onto CCPs, it is conceivable that
23feedback eﬀects become stronger than they currently are.
The second appearance of endogenous risk is the fallacy of composition. It is
not true that if all products are cleared, and therefore appear to be safe, that
the system overall is safe. Indeed, it probably is safer to only require clearing
of products that are mature and well understood, for the risk of CCP failure
imposed by an immature contract is very costly.
The third aspect of endogenous risk arises in the way the guarantee fund of
the CCP is replenished. CCPs provide very little guidance on how exactly
they expect to manage the replenishment by member ﬁrms. It would appear
natural to presume that the CCP would replenish through risk–sensitive (e.g.
VaR) rules whereby in periods of higher risk or past capital losses, the CCP
will ask for new capitalizations. Member ﬁrms being broker dealers, they may
be forced to sell risky assets or increase haircuts to their debtors to raise the
required capital, thereby contributing to procyclicality in the market place.
Even the original move from OTC to CCP will require such a sale as there
currently simply is not enough collateral (Singh, 2010).
The fourth aspect of endogenous risk has to do with the number of CCPs.
Assume that one FI (call it FI1) currently trades with another one, FI2, in
the OTC markets. Assume also, as occurs commonly, that the two ﬁnancial
institutions have two open exposures to each other that roughly net out. If
both exposures were cleared by the same CCP, then a deterioration in the
markets would have no eﬀects on the variation margin calls (but may have
an eﬀect on the initial margin which we ignore for simplicity), and therefore
will not create any feedback loops. If however both positions were cleared
on two separate CCPs with no links between the two CCPs, or one position
on one CCP and the other one stays bilaterally cleared, then an increase
in volatility will lead, regardless of the direction of the markets, to margin
calls and the selling of risk. Again, if capital is ﬁxed in the short run, the
individually prudent course of action is to shed risks. This aﬀects prices,
which in turn aﬀects the mark–to–market capital and VaR of all ﬁnancial
institutions, not just of the two engaged in the original trades. All ﬁnancial
institutions start to act in lock step, and the bridge wobbles. The fallacy
of composition appears again in the sense that even if every exposure is
centrally cleared, the overall exposure is not centrally cleared when there are
multiple CCPs. Cross–margining would mitigate this, as occurs for instance
for options through the OCC hub between ICE Clear US and the CME.
24The ﬁfth endogenous risk feedback eﬀect again has its origin in mark–to–
market. Financial institutions mostly know when a contract is not liquid,
and some ﬁnancial institutions spend enormous amounts of resources on try-
ing to properly value a derivatives position. If such a contract was centrally
cleared and the price made available to the market, this mark may give the
appearance of “oﬃcially correct audited market prices.”9 But it is unavoid-
able that relatively illiquid products will get marks that will force all ﬁnancial
institutions, even the ones that have not traded that day and the ones whose
accurate internal models predict better marks, to mark their books to these
new CCP marks. Since by assumption this market is illiquid, the demand
is inelastic and a big sale on one day will move prices and generate strong
feedbacks through forced selling, leading to a quick drying–up of liquidity.
5 Conclusion
Each ﬁnancial crisis has its own special features, but there are also some
universal themes. In this paper, we have focused on the role of endogenous
risk that propagates through increasingly tight risk constraints, reduction in
risk-bearing capacity and increased volatility. Deleveraging and the shedding
of risk imply that asset price movements increase manifold through the feed-
back eﬀects that are hard-wired into the ﬁnancial system itself. This paper
has aimed at spelling out the precise mechanism through which endogenous
risk manifests itself and has suggested ways of mitigating it.
9CCPs do have put in place mitigating procedures to try to make sure that the marks
are actually prices at which clearing members would be willing to trade.
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